identifies them. Having established this difference and recognized that habit is, in part at least, an affair of neural dispositions, he goes on to a strong argument, based largely upon an intensive study of the effects of injuries to the brain, in favour of the lack of all material or physical basis for true memory ; an argument which has received new support, if not positive confirmation, from several lines of experimental observation during the forty years since the publication of Bergson's *Mature et Memoire.*

But if, accepting provisionally this conclusion, we seek in Bergson's writings some consistent account of the nature of organisms, we are disappointed. I, at least, have sought in vain for such account, and I doubt that it can be found or even read into it, consistently with Bergson's own teaching and with essential biological truths which he neglects.

I turn, therefore, to the other outstanding dualistic biology—that of Hans Driesch—and attempt to indicate its main features very concisely. It is of interest that Driesch began his work as a pioneer in experimental embryology, and has become a philosopher, with much of interest to say on the logic of science, in the course of defending and justifying the vitalistic biology to which he found himself driven by his experimental observations.

The powers of self-regulation and rectification manifested in the course of morphogenesis are the evidences on which he chiefly relies as making any mechanistic theory impossible. And it is now very widely admitted that his arguments are conclusive against any

machine-
theory of the organism. Driesch recognizes the teleo-
logical nature of these and many other organic processes,
and insists as strongly as the holists and the organicists on
the wholeness of the organism; and he is not content to